People not so much concerned with territorial readjustment as with dread of another war with its accompanying bloodbath. Frederick the Great was a great popular figure.
I salute your excellency's star which rises higher and higher. What none of your subjects in their wildest dreams dared hope for - you have made come true. That must be the finest thing a head of state can give to himself and to his people. I congratulate you with all my heart. Conservative Central Office suggested that Chamberlain should take advantage of his popularity by calling a general election.
Lord Halifax warned against this as he regarded Hitler as "a criminal lunatic" and considered it likely that he would break the Munich Agreement that would result in the government losing popularity. Halifax suggested the forming of a National government that should include Chamberlain's critics such as Anthony Eden and Clement Attlee.
Chamberlain rejected the idea saying that this political problem "would be all over in three months". Oceans of ink will flow hereafter in criticism of your action. Lord Halifax had a far more realistic view of Hitler's view of the British government. Hitler saw Chamberlain as a very weak man and was convinced that he would never stand up to him.
Hitler told his generals that :"Our enemies are small worms. I saw them at Munich. If ever that silly old man comes interfering here again with his umbrella, I'll kick him downstairs and jump on his stomach in front of photographers. However, some newspapers did object to the agreement.
The Manchester Guardian reported: "Politically, Czechoslovakia is rendered helpless with all that it means to the balance of forces in Eastern Europe, and Hitler will be able to advance again, when it chooses, with greatly increased force. Thousands of people not so much Czechs as anti-Nazi Sudeten Germans are going to suffer. They must run for their lives or face the rubber truncheons and the concentration camps. Cooper explained how he felt as he arrived at 10 Downing Street following the signing of the agreement: "I was caught up in the large crowd that were demonstrating their enthusiasm and were cheering, laughing, and singing; and there is no greater feeling of loneliness than to be in a crowd of happy, cheerful people and to feel that there is no occasion for oneself for gaiety or for cheering.
That there was every cause for relief I was deeply aware, as much as anybody in this country, but that there was great cause for self-congratulation I was uncertain. Chamberlain pleaded with the men to stay in the government in order to give an image of unity.
However, on 3rd October, Cooper resigned. After a brief interview with Chamberlain, he made his way to Buckingham Palace to hand in his seals of office.
King George VI was polite but frank: "He said he could not agree with me, but he respected those who had the courage of their convictions. After the magnificent efforts of the Prime Minister in the cause of peace it is my fervent hope that a new era of friendship and prosperity may be dawning among the peoples of the world.
Cooper explained why he had resigned from the government and compared the situation with the outbreak of the First World War : "I thought then , and I have always felt, that in any other international crisis that should occur our first duty was to make plain exactly where we stood and what we would do. I believe that the great defect in our foreign policy during recent months and recent weeks has been that we have failed to do so.
During the last four weeks we have been drifting, day by day, nearer into war with Germany, and we have never said, until the last moment, and then in most uncertain terms, that we were prepared to fight. We knew that information to the opposite effect was being poured into the ears of the head of the German State.
He had been assured, reassured, and fortified in the opinion that in no case would Great Britain fight. Duff Cooper then went on to criticise Chamberlain: "The Prime Minister has believed in addressing Herr Hitler through the language of sweet reasonableness.
I have believed that he was more open to the language of the mailed fist. I am glad so many people think that sweet reasonableness has prevailed, but what actually did it accomplish? The Prime Minister went to Berchtesgaden with many excellent and reasonable proposals and alternatives to put before the Fuhrer, prepared to argue and negotiate, as anybody would have gone to such a meeting. He was met by an ultimatum. So far as I am aware no suggestion of an alternative was ever put forward. Cooper ended his speech with the words: "The Prime Minister may be right.
I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, with the deepest sincerity, that I hope and pray that he is right, but I cannot believe what he believes. I wish I could. Therefore, I can be of no assistance to him in his Government. I should be only a hindrance, and it is much better that I should go. I remember when we were discussing the Godesberg ultimatum that I said that if I were a party to persuading, or even to suggesting to, the Czechoslovak Government that they should accept that ultimatum, I should never be able to hold up my head again.
I have forfeited a great deal. I have given up an office that I loved, work in which I was deeply interested and a staff of which any man might be proud. I have given up associations in that work with my colleagues with whom I have maintained for many years the most harmonious relations, not only as colleagues but as friends. I have given up the privilege of serving as lieutenant to a leader whom I still regard with the deepest admiration and affection. I have ruined, perhaps, my political career.
But that is a little matter; I have retained something which is to me of great value - I can still walk about the world with my head erect. In his reply to Cooper's resignation speech, Neville Chamberlain , defended his policy of appeasement.
However, MPs interrupted his speech with cries of "Shame" when he pleaded for a greater understanding of Hitler's position. After everything that has been said about the German Chancellor today and in the past, I do feel that the House ought to recognise the difficulty for a man in that position to take back such emphatic declarations as he had already made amidst the enthusiastic cheers of his supporters, and to recognise that in consenting, even though it were only at the last moment, to discuss with the representatives of other Powers those things which he had declared he had already decided once for all, was a real and a substantial contribution on his part.
Clement Attlee , the leader of the Labour Party, made the most significant attack on the Munich Agreement. We have felt humiliation. This has not been a victory for reason and humanity. It has been a victory for brute force. At every stage of the proceedings there have been time limits laid down by the owner and ruler of armed force. The terms have not been terms negotiated; they have been terms laid down as ultimata. We have seen today a gallant, civilized and democratic people betrayed and handed over to a ruthless despotism.
We have seen something more. We have seen the cause of democracy, which is, in our view, the cause of civilization and humanity, receive a terrible defeat The events of these last few days constitute one of the greatest diplomatic defeats that this country and France have ever sustained. There can be no doubt that it is a tremendous victory for Herr Hitler. Without firing a shot, by the mere display of military force, he has achieved a dominating position in Europe which Germany failed to win after four years of war.
He has overturned the balance of power in Europe. He has destroyed the last fortress of democracy in Eastern Europe which stood in the way of his ambition. He has opened his way to the food, the oil and the resources which he requires in order to consolidate his military power, and he has successfully defeated and reduced to impotence the forces that might have stood against the rule of violence.
Winston Churchill now decided to break with the government over its appeasement policy and two days after Attlee's speech made his move. Churchill praised Chamberlain for his efforts: "If I do not begin this afternoon by paying the usual, and indeed almost invariable, tributes to the Prime Minister for his handling of this crisis, it is certainly not from any lack of personal regard.
Churchill went on to say the negotiations had been a failure: "No one has been a more resolute and uncompromising struggler for peace than the Prime Minister.
Everyone knows that. Never has there been such instance and undaunted determination to maintain and secure peace. That is quite true. Nevertheless, I am not quite clear why there was so much danger of Great Britain or France being involved in a war with Germany at this juncture if, in fact, they were ready all along to sacrifice Czechoslovakia.
The terms which the Prime Minister brought back with him could easily have been agreed, I believe, through the ordinary diplomatic channels at any time during the summer. And I will say this, that I believe the Czechs, left to themselves and told they were going to get no help from the Western Powers, would have been able to make better terms than they have got after all this tremendous perturbation; they could hardly have had worse.
It was now time to change course and form an alliance with the Soviet Union against Nazi Germany. I ventured to appeal to the Government to go a little further than the Prime Minister went, and to give a pledge that in conjunction with France and other Powers they would guarantee the security of Czechoslovakia while the Sudeten-Deutsch question was being examined either by a League of Nations Commission or some other impartial body, and I still believe that if that course had been followed events would not have fallen into this disastrous state.
France and Great Britain together, especially if they had maintained a close contact with Russia, which certainly was not done, would have been able in those days in the summer, when they had the prestige, to influence many of the smaller states of Europe; and I believe they could have determined the attitude of Poland. Such a combination, prepared at a time when the German dictator was not deeply and irrevocably committed to his new adventure, would, I believe, have given strength to all those forces in Germany which resisted this departure, this new design.
Despite this powerful speech Churchill did not vote against the Munich Agreement. The main reason why 20 Conservative MPs abstained rather than voting with the Labour Party was that Chamberlain threatened a general election if his motion was defeated.
Robert Boothby, who only abstained at the time, later recalled: "The terms of the Munich Agreement turned out to be even worse than we had supposed. They amounted to unconditional surrender.
He said afterwards that when he heard Hitler tell the conference at Munich if such it could be called that he proposed to occupy the Sudeten lands, including the Czech fortifications at once But neither Chamberlain nor Daladier made a cheep of protest.
Hitler did not even have to send an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain did that for him. Lord Halifax believed Chamberlain had made a "bad speech" in the Munich Agreement debate and told him afterwards about his dissatisfaction.
Chamberlain later commented: "I had a message from Halifax that he did not like the speech, as he thought it laid too much emphasis on appeasement and was not stiff enough to the dictators. James P. Levy , in the book, Appeasement and Rearmament Britain argues that Neville Chamberlain crafted an active, logical and morally defensible foreign policy designed to avoid and deter a potentially devastating war and to give Britain the chance to rearm.
However, because his strategy was unsuccessful, historians have been unkind to him: "Chamberlain became the collective whipping boy of a British establishment that was desperate to distance itself from what had been an overwhelmingly popular policy back in the s but had failed to avert war and looked pathetic in retrospect.
However, as Graham Macklin has pointed out in his book, Neville Chamberlain : "Interpreting Chamberlain's motives at Munich are of pivotal importance in determining his legacy. Did he genuinely believe that Munich had pacified Europe or was he merely seeking to delay Hitler from being able to deal Britain, a terrible, perhaps mortal blow, and in doing so purchasing time for further rearmament? If it were the latter and indeed lobbying for rearmament to be accelerated. This was the same point made by Duff Cooper in his resignation speech.
Herbrand Sackville , the President of the Board of Education, wrote to Chamberlain about the need to accelerate rearmament. He felt strongly "that we should immediately take new and drastic steps both to strengthen our defences and - almost equally important - to make it clear to the world that we are doing so.
Lord Halifax , agreed and urged that ministers should not make speeches on rearmament "which would preclude consideration of the need for such intensification. The Cabinet minutes records Chamberlain's attitude towards rearmament: "He Chamberlain had been oppressed with the sense that the burden of armaments might break our backs.
This had been one of the factors which had led him to the view that it was necessary to try and resolve the causes which were responsible for the armament race. He thought that we were now in a more hopeful position, and that the contacts which had been established with the Dictator Powers opened up the possibility that we might be able to reach some agreement with them which would stop the armament race.
It was clear, however, that it would be madness for the country to stop rearming until we were convinced that other countries would act in the same way That, however, was not the same thing as to say that Anthony Eden , who had resigned as Foreign Secretary in protest against appeasement, was the strongest supporter in the Conservative Party for rearmament.
In the House of Commons he called for "a national effort in the sphere of defence very much greater than anything that has been attempted hitherto Halifax took this message to Chamberlain but it was rejected. Peter Neville , the author of Neville Chamberlain , argues that Chamberlain's views on rearmament was influenced by his belief in social reform: "Chamberlain If, Chamberlain reasoned, diplomacy could bring about an understanding profoundly worth striving for His belief was that if the burden of arms spending became so heavy that it endangered Britain's economic recovery still at a delicate stage after the Depression , then a diplomatic situation had to be found.
Chamberlain's close friend, Sir George Joseph Ball , Director of the Conservative Research Department, played an important role in promoting the government's foreign policy. Ball controlled the anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi magazine, The Truth , that mounted a smear campaign against the critics of appeasement. Ball, a former member of MI5 , arranged for the telephones of Churchill and Eden to be tapped. In the aftermath of Munich he dismantled the Foreign Office News Department, making 10 Downing Street the sole repository for government news.
Another important figure was George Steward , Downing Street's chief press liaison officer who, MI5 discovered, had told an official at the German Embassy that Britain would "give Germany everything she asks for the next year".
Ball urged Chamberlain to make use of his popularity by calling a snap election. His cabinet colleagues warned against this fearing that during the campaign Hitler would break the promises he made at Munich. Lord Halifax thought an election would be far too risky and urged Chamberlain to form a government of national unity. Halifax believed this government should include Clement Attlee , Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden and other critics of appeasement. Churchill wrote to Paul Reynaud , a French politician who was opposed to appeasement, claiming that it was the worst defeat for Britain since He claimed that the public mood was still pro-Munich for any campaign against Chamberlain's foreign policy to have an effect.
Churchill even considered whether it might be best for Britain and France to do a deal with Hitler: "The question now presenting itself is: Can we make head against the Nazi domination, or ought we severally to make the best terms possible with it - while trying to rearm?
Chamberlain rejected the idea as the last thing he wanted to do was to reward those people who had made life difficult over the last few months. He pointed out that "our foreign policy was one of appeasement" with the central aim of "establishing relations with the Dictator Powers which will lead to a settlement in Europe and to a sense of stability".
He said what he wanted, above all, was "more support for my policy, and not a strengthening of those who don't believe in it". Gradually, the British public began to change their mind about what had agreed at Munich. By the end of October, , virtually every Czech border fortification was in German hands, and any defence of those that remained was impossible. Its capital, Prague, was less than forty miles from the new frontier.
Czechoslovakia had handed over to the Reich 11, square miles of territory that was inhabited by 2,, Sudeten Germans and , Czechs. The country's communications infrastructure had been badly damaged and the country had lost three-quarters of its industrial production.
The local Labour and Liberal parties decided that they would support the anti-appeasement candidate, A. Lindsay , who was the was vice-chancellor of Oxford University.
Lindsay, the former Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow , was also involved in setting up several unemployment clubs in the town.
During the campaign Lindsay argued: "Along with men and women of all parties I deplored the irresolution and tardiness of a Government which never made clear to Germany where this country was prepared to take a stand look with the deepest misgiving at the prospect before us Hogg argued that Lindsay was putting forward a negative message: "The issue in this election is going to be very clear.
I am standing for a definite policy. Peace by negotiation. Lindsay is standing for no definite policy that he can name. He stands for national division against national unity.
His policy is a policy of two left feet walking backward! Lindsay replied: "Suppose you had a child desperately ill. All night long you pray without ceasing, and in the morning she seems better. Tasks Background Teachers' notes External links Connections to curriculum After the First World War, the map of Europe was re-drawn and several new countries were formed. As a result of this, three million Germans found themselves now living in part of Czechoslovakia.
When Adolf Hitler came to power, he wanted to unite all Germans into one nation. In September he turned his attention to the three million Germans living in part of Czechoslovakia called the Sudetenland. Sudeten Germans began protests and provoked violence from the Czech police. Hitler claimed that Sudeten Germans had been killed. This was not actually the case, but Hitler used it as an excuse to place German troops along the Czech border.
During this situation, the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, flew to meet Hitler at his private mountain retreat in Berchtesgaden in an attempt to resolve the crisis. Look at Source 2a. Write a summary of this part of the meeting by adding one sentence to each of these three starters:. Hitler was capable of being charming, of lying and of bullying.
Find examples of all three of these aspects of his personality in all three sources. The Treaty of Versailles, made in at the end of the First World War, was intended to make a lasting peace. Many people felt that the Treaty had caused terrible resentment in Germany on which Hitler had been able to play in order to achieve power. Hitler was open about his refusal to accept many of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. Soon after he became Chancellor of Germany in he began to re-arm the country, breaking the restrictions placed on the German armed forces.
Czechoslovakia was the logical next step for his aggression and German Nazis in the Sudetenland were told to stir up the trouble that led to the crisis examined here. Edvard Benes, the leader of Czechoslovakia, was concerned that if Germany was given the Sudetenland, most of the Czech defences would be handed over to the Germans and they would be left defenceless. In March , Hitler annexed the rest of Czechoslovakia, and the country ceased to exist.
After eight months of ineffectual wartime leadership, Chamberlain was replaced as prime minister by Winston Churchill. But if you see something that doesn't look right, click here to contact us! The Nautilus was constructed under the direction of U. Navy Captain Hyman G. Rickover, a brilliant Russian-born engineer who joined the U. In , he was put in In Oxford, Mississippi, James H.
Marshals, setting off a deadly riot. Two men were killed before the violence was quelled by more than 3, federal soldiers. He also criticized the League of Nations for not fulfilling its promise to revise the Versailles treaty. The advocates of peace argued that the Allies created Czechoslovakia solely to contain Germany and that the British and French organized the League of Nations as an anti-German bloc. Glasgow believed Czechoslovakia was created by Great Power intrigue to dam future German expansion.
Lord Elton stated that the Sudeten Germans were given to Czechoslovakia because the French Marshal Foch demanded a military frontier bordering Germany. Elton criticized Dr. Benes, the Czech President, because in May , he had promised that the new Czechoslovakia would be neutral.
Instead, Benes allowed his country to get involved in military alliances whose goals were to keep Germany down by force. Elton also claimed that the League of Nations was the alliance created by the victors of World War I to maintain the unjust peace settlement. The appeasement supporters criticized the peacemakers at the Paris Peace Conference as hypocrites who ignored the plea of the Sudeten Germans for self-determination.
They also criticized the Allies and the League for not solving the Sudeten problem before it reached critical proportions.
Robert Parker, also writing in the Fortnightly , claimed that the Sudeten Germans demanded the right to join Austria on the basis of Point 10 of Wilson's Fourteen Points which promised the peoples of Austria-Hungary free opportunity for autonomous development. This was refused by the Allies because the Czechs, according to Parker, used questionable tactics to persuade the Entente that they depended on the industrial areas in the Sudetenland.
Parker assumed from this that the vanquished can only claim self-determination if it does not injure the interests of the victors. They advocated that Britain should recognize this fact or risk becoming involved in another needless and more destructive war. Glasgow believed that Germany could not be kept down; therefore, Britain must accept it as a strong power. The advocates of appeasement also argued that the German claim to the Sudetenland.
Many of them viewed it as Germany's destiny to expand and dominate Central Europe. Powys Greenwood, a great admirer of Germany, writing for the Contemporary Review , was the main proponent of conciliation between Britain and Germany.
Greenwood believed that the exaggerated imperialistic goals of Germany were the natural compensation for their being denied expansion and their lack of colonies. He described the German people as energetic and intelligent; not the insatiable monsters aspiring for world conquest that the opposition claimed them to be. Greenwood viewed them as frustrated not only because they failed to establish rule over other peoples, but also because they saw many of their own people living under alien rule.
They claimed that Hitler merely wanted to unite all Germans into one Reich and did not aim for world domination. The proponents of peace also regarded Hitler as rational and therefore believed that he did not want war.
Spender in the Contemporary Review contended that the German populace wanted peace, a fact that Hitler could not ignore. Based on his favorable interpretation Hitler's book, Mein Kampf Greenwood believed the Nazi rejection of the imperialistic idea of conquering and subjugating other peoples. He stated that Hitler's two foreign policy goals were clearly outlined in Mein Kampf to unite the German people and to secure them lebensraum, living room. Appeasement advocates had faith in Hitler's statement that he would not be led astray by dreams of world domination since it would endanger the purity of his all German Reich.
Greenwood believed that it was Hitler's aim to dominate through political and economic influence and not military force to secure Mitteleuropa under German leadership. Conquest of other nations would have violated Hitler's goal since it would have included other races in the Reich. Germany would have acted as the protector and leader of the Eastern European nationalities and excluded Russian and French influence there. Peace supporters, claiming that Germany was not aiming at world domination or the breakup of the British Empire, argued that it was coming to the end of its demands in Europe.
They also believed that once the German demands were satisfied, Hitler would become less aggressive and begin a new era of peace. Greenwood stated that once Germany renounced trading and colonial ambitions, Britain would have no reason to fight.
He claimed that once Germany's territorial demands were exhausted, Hitler would be prepared to negotiate an understanding with Britain and would agree to arms limitations. Greenwood advocated peaceful relations with Germany since it was only war that could prevent it from claiming its natural demand for dominance and security.
He added that Nazi battle cries would fade away once peace was established and the Germans were satisfied with their Greater Reich. Those who endorsed appeasement also viewed the Sudeten Germans as a suppressed minority living under unfriendly alien rule. Robert Parker, writing in the Fortnightly , regarded the Czechs as ruthless people bent on dominating the other nationalities under them.
He claimed that the Czechs themselves were never oppressed under the humanitarian Habsburg rule, but yet they sought to subject their new German subjects. In his editorial letter in The Times London , Archibald Ramsay described the Czechs as vicious exploiters of the Sudeten Germans and claimed that the vague Czech concessions were just a smoke screen for their continued oppression of the German minority.
Parker claimed that they attempted to Czechize the Sudeten territories because of their jealousy of German economic dominance. The Czechs sought to weaken the Sudetens by economic and political oppression. This, combined with their anti-German foreign policy, was the reason for Hitler "hammering at Prague's door. The peace advocates blamed the Czechoslovaks for not solving the controversy long before it became a volatile issue.
An editorial in The Times argued that Czech reforms considering the Sudetens should have been carried out a long time ago and claimed that if the problem was addressed earlier, there would have been no crisis.
The editorial further stated that the Sudeten problems would probably not have been addressed if they were not championed by Germany. Spender, writing in the Contemporary Review , saw the Czechs as victims of their own mistake of not solving the problem of the Sudeten Germans. He saw the generous concessions by the Czechs during negotiations to solve the controversy as admittance of this mistake. He also placed blame upon Britain, France and Russia for clamping a reluctant minority on Czechoslovakia.
The appeasement proponents supported the claim of the Sudeten Germans as righting a wrong committed at Versailles. Arthur Bryant, writing for the Illustrated London News , believed that the Sudetens were subjected to the rule of an alien race due to a humiliating peace treaty. He claimed that they underwent economic suffering that could possibly have been racially motivated. Bryant stated that self-determination could not be denied to them just because the Allies defeated the Germans in a war or disliked them.
A war, he believed, would cost millions of lives and would be fought so the Czechs could continue to oppress their German minority. Despite their pro-German line, some of the peace endorsers realized that the Sudeten grievances and German claims of Czech tyranny were overblown exaggerations.
However, they still contended that the Sudetens had justified grievances that should have been addressed. Spender stated that even though the Sudeten grievances were exaggerated, there were enough to attract the attention of Germany, a close enemy of Czechoslovakia.
He also pointed to Lord Runciman's report that stated that the Sudetens would not live as loyal citizens in Czechoslovakia if a moderate settlement was agreed upon. Spender mentioned a message from a correspondent reporting from the Sudetenland in August that the Germans there truly feared that they were going to be killed by the Czechs.
He said that German propaganda caused the overblown fear that was regarded as real to the Sudetens. The proponents of peace generally believed that the controversy could only be settled by compromise, which to some meant territorial revision. Robert Parker argued that Hitler would not go to war since Czechoslovakia was completely at his mercy but contradictorily stated that the maintenance of Czechoslovakia was important as a barrier to Hitler.
Spender proposed that the Sudeten problem be settled early by negotiation since it may have escalated beyond control. The Times advocating territorial revision consistently throughout the crisis, printed on 7 September , an editorial that favored the partition of Czechoslovakia:.
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